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internal and external acts; how and why habitus can grow and decay; what makes their unity when 
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why intellectual habitus represent a special case that triggered considerable debate; how human 
beings can be said to be free if their actions are determined by moral habitus. 
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The present volume is dedicated to the concept of habitus in medieval philosophy. Its purpose is to 
assess the actual importance of this notion for medieval thinkers, in light of recent advances in 
medieval cognitive psychology and medieval moral theory, which have been the object of sustained 
attention in the last ten years. 
To our knowledge, there have been only two extensive studies on the history of the concept of 
habitus from Aristotle to the twentieth century. The first is the habilitation thesis of Peter Nickl 
(2001).3 The other is a volume of collected papers edited by Tom Sparrow and Adam Hutchinson 
(2013).4 To date, only a few monographs have been published on this notion, focused on specific 
authors: Oswald Fuchs’s thorough but dated study of the psychology of habitus in William of 
Ockham (1952); Rolf Darge’s authoritative monograph (1996) on the knowledge of habitus and the 
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function of moral habitus in the structuring of action in Thomas Aquinas; and Bonnie Kent’s classic 
study on virtues of the will (1995). A handful of articles have also been written on moral habitus in 
Aquinas.5 The present volume is thus the first work to deal with the central characteristics and 
evolution of this notion during the height of Latin medieval scholasticism in the thirteenth and 
fourteenth centuries, providing studies of a number of medieval authors, trying to keep a balance 
between well-known thinkers of the time, such as Bonaventure, Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, and 
Ockham, and less well-known but crucially important authors such as Henry of Ghent, Peter John 
Olivi, Thomas of Sutton, Peter Auriol, John Buridan, and Richard Kilvington. Studies of Augustine, 
Francisco Suárez, and Descartes give insight into both the foundations of medieval conceptions and 
their subsequent developments, thus bringing to the volume a longue durée perspective. Given the 
exploratory nature of the volume, an exhaustive treatment was not an attainable goal. Many 
doctrines remain to be studied, especially before the golden age of scholasticism, such as the works 
of Gilbert de Poitiers, and after it, with authors such as John Capreolus and Thomas Cajetan. 
Nevertheless, we believe that this volume provides valuable insights into the foundations of 
medieval conceptions and shows how Suárez and Descartes summed up the medieval tradition and 
used it as a starting point for their own thinking. 
Habitus is a key feature of the philosophical psychology inherited from both the Aristotelian 
and Augustinian traditions, Augustine and Aristotle being the key authorities throughout the 
medieval period.6 In the Metaphysics, Aristotle defines habitus as dispositions through which 
something or someone is well disposed or ill-disposed in herself or with regard to something else 
(Met. 5.20, 1022b12–14). In the Categories, however, he distinguishes dispositions from habitus, 
the latter being more firmly entrenched than the former (Cat. 8, 8b27). In the same work he defines 
habitus as absolute qualities (Cat. 7, 6b5) but also as relative to something (Cat. 8, 11a20–32). This 
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led to debate among medieval authors, with some going so far as to deem habitus relations rather 
than qualities (see part 2 of the present introduction). In the De anima, dealing specifically with 
intellectual habitus, Aristotle says that they are the result of a change of quality, through the 
repetition of the corresponding acts (De an. 2.5, 417a32). Finally, in the Nicomachean Ethics, 
Aristotle defines virtues as praiseworthy habitus (NE 1.13, 1103a9). He also assigns non-
intellectual virtues to the irrational parts of the soul. This seems to mean that virtues cannot belong 
to powers that are capable of opposites, a claim that almost no medieval author shares, since most 
admit of habitus in the will. As for Augustine, he does not give a single definition of habitus that 
was systematically be adopted by medieval authors, but his treatment of the subject and particularly 
of virtues is foundational for how medieval authors deal with the theological aspects of the problem, 
as will emerge in the volume. 
The philosophical psychology that medieval thinkers found in Aristotle, his account of habitus 
in particular, is complex and not entirely consistent throughout the whole corpus. Furthermore, 
medieval thinkers were mostly theologians.  Their efforts were therefore especially focused on 
producing systematic accounts aimed at solving the various tensions in Aristotle’s works and 
accounting for a number of theological doctrines, such as the doctrine of the theological virtues, 
free will, and even the problem of the Incarnation.7 Despite sharing the same philosophical starting 
point of Aristotle, however, medieval authors held a great diversity of positions. A habitus is a 
conceptual tool that no medieval thinker can dispense with when dealing with what makes up a 
human being and what the determining factors of his actions are, be they virtuous or vicious or 
morally neutral, or inner mental acts or external acts geared towards the outside world. Widely 
divergent philosophical options were defended on these topics. 
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Let us illustrate this with the example of the role of habitus in the decision-making process. The 
majority view is that habitus play an essential role in the decision-making process and thus also in 
how external bodily acts occur. But it is usually only derivatively that habitus can be attributed to 
any other power than the powers of the soul, for habitus are dispositions primarily of rational 
powers, and of other powers only insofar as they can be commanded by the rational powers. 
However, not all authors adopt this view. Olivi, for instance, thinks our powers of perception can be 
habituated even to acts that are not under the command of rational powers (see part 7 of the 
introduction). This example is fairly typical, as, except for a few core definitional features (see part 
1 of the introduction), medieval authors are not in unanimous agreement on many features of 
habitus. The disagreement can be about virtually anything, from the function of habits, to their 
ontological status to their contribution to the morality of voluntary and involuntary acts. 
A remark must be made on the vocabulary used. Among our contributors, eleven have chosen to 
use the Latin word habitus,8 while nine have chosen the term “habit.”9 Other terms can of course be 
used, such as “disposition,” but the most usual translation in English is “habit,” which allows for a 
better connection of medieval conceptions to contemporary ones. However, the term brings with it 
some ambiguity. Indeed, in its most common usage, the word “habit” describes some of our 
common behaviour which we might not have the power to control; the equivalent Latin term would 
be consuetudo.10 Though the distinction is not always sharp for medieval thinkers, habitus, by 
contrast, are usually characterized by the fact that (1) they are at our disposal, and (2) they facilitate 
our actions but do not infringe upon our freedom to do or not to do them. For this reason, and to 
avoid ambiguity, we have chosen in this introduction to use the term habitus; however, given that, 
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as we just explained, arguments can be made in favour of both uses, we have chosen to respect the 
choice of each contributor to this volume. 
In what follows, we will briefly touch upon several issues that are raised by medieval thinkers 
about habitus: the theoretical necessity to posit them; their nature; their causal contribution the 
production of internal and external acts; how and why habitus can grow and decay; what makes 
their unity when they can have multiple objects and work in clusters. Finally we examine two 
specific questions: why intellectual habitus represent a special case that triggered considerable 
debate; how human beings can be said to be free if their actions are determined by moral habitus. 
All these issues are dealt with by the articles in this volume, which are organized chronologically 
according to the authors discussed. 
1. Why do medieval philosophers posit habitus? 
The central place of habitus in medieval philosophy has long been recognized, given that the 
medieval scholastics inherit Aristotle’s definition from Nicomachean Ethics 2.3 of virtue as habitus. 
But habitus is a pervasive element of Aristotelian-inspired psychology. Indeed, there are a great 
many kinds of habitus, such as intellectual habitus, which constitute our knowledge, habitus in our 
sensitive powers, which allow us to better feel and control our passions, and even habitus in the 
body, by which our organs retain the capacity to do what they frequently perform. 
Some general description of the framework within which medieval authors work is required in 
order to pinpoint the exact function of habitus in it.11 For Aristotle, the soul is the principle of life in 
the body (De an. 2.1). A power or faculty of the soul can be defined as a part of the soul that is 
concerned with a certain kind of act. In books 2 and 3 of the De anima, Aristotle depicts the soul as 
having three main faculties that belong to an increasingly narrow range of living beings: nutrition, 
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which concerns all animate creatures; perception, which concerns only animals; and the mind, 
which performs higher mental functions such as reasoning and understanding, and belongs only to 
human beings. 
Faculties account not only for the cognitive life of the soul but also for its conative dimension. 
Desire and motion are complex phenomena, for they involve both the representations of objects, 
desire for them and practical reason telling animals, even non-humans in a primitive form, what 
needs to be done for the desire to be fulfilled. In the Aristotelian framework, it is unclear which 
faculty desire and voluntary motion should be attributed to. This is why, in the Middle Ages, under 
the influence of Augustine, a new faculty emerges: the will, which is concerned with affective and 
volitive acts that aim at what is good.12 Medieval thinkers, highly concerned with the freedom of 
man, admit of free will (liberum arbitrium), usually conceived as an intermediate faculty combining 
intellect and will in order to perform free acts. Such acts are characterized by intellectual 
deliberation and unconstrained, voluntary decision upon this deliberation. This decision is the cause 
of the action, whether it is inner or geared to the outside world.13 Other views, such as that of Duns 
Scotus, but also those of Peter John Olivi and Henry of Ghent, hold that freedom is present only in 
the will, the intellect being a power entirely determined by what is outside of it.14 
In this account of human nature, habitus are defined by their function in the psychological 
mechanisms that lead to thinking and acting. In a nutshell, they are used to explain how such 
powers are moved to elicit the kinds of act associated with them. One of the main features of 
habitus is that they are usually not present before any kind of act has taken place, since by 
definition habitus are acquired dispositions.15 Once an act has been performed, a habitus appears 
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which will influence all subsequent acts of the same kind, making it an overwhelming determining 
factor of human action. The precise effect of habitus on acts varies according to author and context: 
some might change the way things appear to us, others make actions easier, more intense, or more 
pleasurable. Medieval thinking on the subject is extremely rich, as the papers in the present volume 
demonstrate. 
Habitus are not to be confused with other kinds of disposition, such as instincts. Instincts are 
present in humans whatever they do and orientate their actions from birth. Habitus, by contrast, are 
acquired over the course of human life and thus represent the fact that the way in which humans live 
and act progressively determines what they are and what they will do. As instincts are natural, 
habitus are called by some “connatural,” or “second nature.”16 This is the origin of their name: just 
as its Greek equivalent hexis, the term habitus literally means something that is had, possessed, or 
assumed by the soul, just as clothes are put on. In its original, Aristotelian sense, however, just as in 
its Augustinian and medieval senses—as Isabelle Bochet’s paper shows—it refers to something that 
is had in a stable manner, that is, it cannot be easily lost.17 A habitus of the soul is the lingering 
trace left by an act in the soul, which modifies it from then on. It must be distinguished from weak 
dispositions, which are acquired and do the same thing as habitus, but do not have any stable being 
in the soul. They incline weakly and can disappear easily.18 
The core issue with habitus is that, though they are really present in the soul, they cannot be 
known directly (i.e. without any reasoning) by some form of inner perception; by contrast, acts can 
be known in this way.19 One can know directly that one is reasoning or desiring something at any 
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given moment but one cannot know directly that one has a particular tendency or aptitude toward 
such reasoning or acting. Instead, habitus are posited because certain features of our acts that we 
can directly perceive must be explained. John Duns Scotus provides a canonical list of these 
features. Indeed, as Magali Roques and Olivier Boulnois note, habitus for Scotus allows a power to 
operate “delectabiliter, faciliter, expedite et prompte,” (“with pleasure, ease, readiness, and 
swiftness.”)20 Of course, as Magali Roques reminds us in her paper, not all authors accepted all 
features of habitus.21 Ockham, for one, did not think pleasure was a necessary feature of habitus-
inclined acts. Nonetheless, habitus served to explain the occurrence of these naturally and 
empirically observed features, which are the product of the habitus’ inclination to certain acts. 
Inclination in this sense, however, is not always enough to describe the effect habitus have on 
our acts. Juhana Toivanen’s paper deals directly with another type of habitus, put forward in an 
original way by Peter John Olivi.22 Olivi clearly posits habitus which function as modifiers of our 
outlook. Habitus can influence the features of our acts by making intentional content receivable 
under any kind of aspect, i.e., a proposition as true or false, a certain food item as good or bad and 
so on. For instance, for Olivi, certain habitus colour our view of things in such a way that we might 
assent or dissent to a given proposition according to these habitus. Such habitus do not make acts 
easier or quicker but work merely as a kind of filter.  
The theological concerns of medieval thinkers also come at the fore, since elements of the 
Catholic doctrine call for some virtuous or vicious dispositions to be posited in the souls of humans 
in order to account for the fact that their acts should be deemed to win them merit, which can only 
occur when these acts are somehow determined by God’s grace.23 Now, what we have said up to 
now applies to naturally acquired habitus that are used to account for our observable acts or the 
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observable features of our acts. But, for medieval theologians, there are also supernatural habitus 
given by God. These do not serve to explain any observable fact; indeed, the fact that such habitus 
can remain unmanifested is one of their central features. Kent’s paper explains it most clearly: 
theologians have to solve a problem.24 They have to show that, even though some central, 
supremely virtuous figures of the Bible, such as Abraham, did not display the same degree of virtue 
as others, they were, in fact, just as virtuous. This is why Peter Lombard and his followers, 
following Augustine, stress the importance of virtues as dispositions that, even though they are not 
necessarily acted upon, make someone meritorious in the eyes of God. Thus, even though Abraham 
did not display chastity because it was uncalled for at a time when God wanted his people to grow 
and multiply, he had it in disposition and would have displayed it if he had had to. For this reason, 
he had no less merit than would later, chaste Christians. 
As Kent also explains, this ties into the problem of baptism and the salvation of children. 
Catholic dogma holds that, when baptism is performed, the baptized, through a supernatural 
operation, receives the three theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity. Children, of course, 
cannot properly exercise virtue; for instance, they cannot, at a young age, believe, or even 
understand the articles of faith. Infused virtues in children are therefore the paradigmatic example 
of habitus that are not manifested because they cannot be manifested. What then is the use of 
positing that children have infused virtues? For medieval theologians, it allowed for their salvation. 
Even though they are not acted upon, infused virtues are enough to justify children and ensure they 
reach eternal life. As such, unmanifested infused virtues are more akin to habitus of being rather 
than habitus of doing, as they represent a kind of spiritual health. In any case, what habitus are 
supposed to explain is always features of acts, whether they be observed or posited according to 
dogma. As the medieval saying goes: “Habitus per acta cognoscuntur.”25 
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We now have a broad view of what philosophical and theological interest habitus have and what 
kind of function they perform in solving problems pertaining to the two disciplines. But even 
though they perform the same kind of function, habitus can vary widely in their ontological status, 
the kinds of acts they explain, and the faculties where they are to be posited. We will attempt to 
sketch a more detailed picture of these variations. 
2. The ontology of habitus 
Following Aristotle’s remarks in Categories (8a25–10a26), medieval thinkers usually define 
habitus as qualities of the soul that belong to it in a stable manner, just as a wall painted red is red in 
a stable manner and only considerable effort or wear and tear can make it cease to be red. But 
habitus are not just any kind of quality: they are dispositional in nature. Medieval thinkers such as 
Aquinas capture the dispositional nature of habitus by attributing to them a special mode of being. 
Take a human being without any acquired qualities, such as a child who has experienced and done 
nothing. When he first plays music, he is performing an act. After he ceases playing, he has 
acquired the habitus of playing music. The simple fact of having the habitus does not make him 
play music all the time, but he has nonetheless acquired a quality which informs his faculties. This 
quality is said to be a first actuality of the power or powers of the child involved in playing music. 
When he subsequently plays music, this quality is actualized for as long as he plays. This is called a 
second actuality of the power or powers of the child involved in playing music. Just like the 
inexperienced child, a power of the soul is by itself in absolute potency, and it can be informed by 
habitus, which are first actualities. These habitus can then be actualized so that acts, which are also 
qualities, are realized. These acts are second actualities. 
Authors in the fourteenth century such as Ockham begin investigating whether this 
metaphysical framework is appropriate to account for the dispositional nature of habitus. As Magali 
Roques explains, Ockham holds that we can experience that we feel that we are inclined to think of 
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something because of a habitus.26 But when we are asleep we do not feel any such inclination. This 
means that something must be posited in the soul to account for this phenomenal difference, and the 
distinction between first and second actuality is without any explanatory relevance: while for 
Aquinas there is merely a habitus which is in first actuality and which becomes an act when it is 
actualized in a second actuality, for Ockham a habitus when actualized engenders an inclination 
which is distinct from it and which itself engenders an act; this act is distinct from both the habitus 
and the inclination.27 John Buridan uses a similar argument to prove that occurrent and dispositional 
thinking must be differentiated at the ontological level. Following the skeptical worries raised by 
John of Mirecourt and condemned by the faculty of theology at the University of Paris, authors 
from the fourteenth century went further and asked whether a metaphysics of the soul based on the 
distinction between substance and accident was the only possible one with which to explain the 
activity of the soul. Gyula Klima and Jack Zupko show that Buridan defends the majority view and 
argues that it is better to keep the distinction between habitus and the other dispositional aspects of 
the soul, such as its faculties.28 
The ontological status of habitus in this metaphysical framework was the subject of a debate in 
the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, which is well documented in the present volume. 
Certain habitus, some authors say, cannot be considered as mere qualities. This stems from the fact 
that habitus is also considered by Aristotle as a separate category, among the other minor 
categories, also known in the Middle Ages as the sex principia, namely action, passio, ubi, quando, 
situs, and habitus. Moreover, in Categories 15, 15b21, habitus is also considered as a post-
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predicament, that is, as a predicate said in multiple senses, each of which belongs to a different 
category. In both cases, Aristotle stresses the relational aspect of habitus.29  
As Martin Pickavé shows, talking about Giles of Rome, some habitus in the category of quality 
also need the mode of another category, namely relation: the habitual knowledge of something, for 
instance, is related to what is known and exists because of it. This habitual knowledge is a quality of 
the soul that possesses the mode of a relation. Similarly, a virtuous habitus possesses the mode of a 
relation to a given moral norm. In other words, if one wants to attribute to habitus the property of 
having intentional content, then it cannot be considered as a mere quality but must include a relation 
to this content or to the cause of this content. 
This idea was further developed in the fourteenth century. Some authors defend what Peter J. 
Hartman calls in his paper a “Novel Theory of Habit,” at least as regards intellective habitus.30 
According to this theory, as exemplified by the doctrines of Durand of Saint-Pourçain and Prosper 
of Reggio Emilia, habitus are not absolute qualities but relations that do not inhere in the intellect 
but in an “ostensive” power that shows its objects to the intellect. Habitus dispose the ostensive 
power to show objects to the intellect with more or less ease. Thus, intellectual acts, though they 
exist in the intellect, are merely relations, the terms of which are the intellect and its objects. 
Intellect, on this view, is entirely passive: the ostensive power does all the work and the habitus 
merely accounts for how easy it is for it to put certain objects into relation with the intellect. Just as, 
on the standard theory, a habitus is a quality that disposes its subject towards another quality, the 
corresponding act, in the novel theory a habitus is a relation that disposes its subject towards 
another relation. 
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30 See p. 000 
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This theory rests upon the idea that simple acts of intellection are not active but passive causes 
of habitus. This is not, however, the only model by which habitual causation is explained, as we 
will now see. 
3. How habitus cause 
Habitus shapes actions and thoughts. What are its precise contributions to their production? If 
significant causal efficacy is attributed to it, then one runs the risk of depriving the powers of the 
soul of their causal relevance, making it redundant and departing from the Aristotelian claim that 
powers, at least the higher ones, are active, a view to which medieval authors are attached. What is 
at stake is the distribution of causal power between power and habitus. 
The volume presents five different positions, which shows that this was a highly debated topic. 
According to the first one, which is the most common, habitus (or, in Ockham’s case, the clusters of 
habitus and inclinations) function as partial causes of acts. They have in themselves causal power, 
and when an act is accomplished this power is exerted concurrently with that of the powers of the 
soul, in such a way that the act is performed more or less easily, swiftly, etc. Inasmuch as habitus 
have causal power and exert it, they can be called an active principle of the act. 
One might want to refine this model and explain the plasticity of faculties working together in 
the production of an act. On a second view, which is more modular, habitus are not partial causes of 
acts but independent causes of partial acts. Suppose for example that the intellect is to assent to a 
given proposition. On the first view, the intellect would by itself form the proposition and 
accomplish an act of assent regarding it. The habitus would facilitate this operation, but the 
operation could occur without it. On the second view, by contrast, the intellect would merely form 
the proposition and the habitus would, by itself and without any contribution from the causal power 
of the intellect, produce the act of assent to the proposition. As Dominik Perler shows, this is the 
position of Francisco Suárez: intellect and habitus are both seen as qualities of the soul that can be 
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called respectively primary and secondary principles of acts.31 As Perler puts it, the soul comes to 
be seen as a network of a myriad producers of different acts or aspects of acts.32 
Some authors develop a completely different view of the inner workings of the intellect. Habitus 
in it are active all the time, except when they are obstructed in their activity. More precisely, 
according to this third view, which is that of Thomas of Sutton, as presented by Jean-Luc Solère, a 
habitus is merely the trace left in a power of an external principle which remains active in it.33 
Nothing in the arrow makes it move in a certain direction: thus, it is not an active principle of its 
movement, even though it retains in itself the force of the active principle, which is the bow. 
Similarly, habitus do not have in themselves any causal power, but are that which has been left in 
the soul by the external active principle. This implies that habitus are always actively inclining the 
intellect in a certain direction: indeed, just as an arrow, once it becomes inert, has no capacity to 
move again if it is not shot again from a bow, so a habitus, if it were to stop inclining, could never 
by itself incline again. Thus, if habitus are to be kept in the soul, they must always incline, and the 
only reason why their corresponding acts are not always realized is because of impediments that 
prevent the actualization of more than one habitus at any given time. As regards the intellect, for 
instance, an impediment to the consideration of a given intelligible species might be another 
intelligible species currently being considered, or the will refusing to consider a given species. 
Conversely, when a given habitus is actualized, it is because it corresponds to the phantasm 
engendered by a current sensory stimulus, or simply because the will wills the intellect to consider 
this particular species. 
Yet other views completely deprive habitus of any causal influence in the production of acts. 
This can be because habitus influence only the subject of acts and not the acts themselves. On this 
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fourth view, which is that of Auriol, as put forward by Martin Pickavé, habitus have no direct 
causal role in the accomplishment of the act itself.34 They do, however, change the circumstances of 
the act on the side of the agent. On this view, the ease and pleasure an agent has and feels when 
acting derive from the effect of habitus on him, and not on his acts. Alternatively, habitus might 
have simply no causal influence. On this fifth and final view, habitus are merely sine qua non 
causes, such as in the case of what Peter J. Hartman calls the Novel Theory of Habitus, as seen 
above.35 Though they exert no causal power whatsoever, they must nevertheless be really present in 
the soul for acts to be accomplished in a particular way. 
Some of these different views seem to have important implications for the way in which human 
nature is understood. The first and second view allow for the habitus in the soul to be seen as parts 
of a kind of toolbox containing automatic tools. They do not do anything by themselves, but when 
the will wants it and circumstances are appropriate, they can be fired up to improve and accelerate 
our acts. Man is in control and can elect, or not, to make use of his habitus. The third view presents 
an entirely different account: habitus, which are not active by themselves are always exerting their 
causality on the soul. Our role, and the role of circumstances, is merely to determine which of them 
will, so to speak, emerge victorious in the race to actualization, or to inhibit their effect by an act of 
the will. On this view, we are constantly on the receiving end of countless influences and all we can 
do is resist them or and grant privilege to one over the others. This does not necessarily change 
anything to our freedom to choose what we want, but it does entail a different view of our activity 
and our relationship to the world as a whole. 
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4. The growth and decay of habitus 
As we have seen, habitus grow in strength as acts are accomplished. Habitus, be they natural or 
supernatural in origin, can also wane or even disappear if they are not used for a long time. The 
strength of a habitus can be known on the phenomenal level through our own acts, which we 
perceive as easier or harder, and more or less swift and pleasurable. Authors such as Buridan, 
according to Jack Zupko,36 or Suárez, according to Dominik Perler,37 insist on the idea that, as 
regards dispositions, growth can be a transformative process, inasmuch as a weak disposition, 
which can be thought of as a weak and unstable habitus, grows with each corresponding act until it 
actually becomes a habitus. Thus, acts do not directly produce habitus, but reinforce weak 
dispositions until they are habitus properly speaking, which are different in nature. 
On the ontological level, this happens through a process of intension and remission of forms. 
Like any quality, a habitus can be intensified.38 Paradigmatic examples of the intension and 
remission of forms for medieval authors are intensifying moral qualities, such as God-given charity, 
whose intensity quite literally determines the moral value of acts. This is why, at the end of the 
thirteenth century and during the fourteenth, medieval authors developed ways to conceive the 
precise measurement of such an intensity. This move is most visible in Sentences commentaries, but 
as Monika Michałowska paper innovatively demonstrates, this also happens in fourteenth-century 
commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics written by the Oxford Calculators.39 Those commentaries 
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not only are interesting for the mathematization of moral philosophy, but also illuminate core 
concepts of Aristotelian ethics, such as habitus and disposition. 
Indeed, as Michałowska explains, Richard Kilvington claims that an individual always starts 
with what he calls a dispositio, be it mala or bona, which inclines him, to a greater or lesser degree, 
towards vicious or virtuous actions. But such an individual cannot be called virtuous or vicious: 
only when he has acted can he be said to be virtuous of vicious. A natural dispositio is also 
inalienable, in such a way that even the most vicious person, if he had a natural inclination to virtue, 
will remain inclined to it throughout his life. 
It is also interesting to note, as Michałowska does, that Kilvington thinks habitus in the soul do 
not decrease exactly as qualities in material things.40 Such qualities, he believes, decrease only 
when exposed to the opposite quality: heat decreases only when a hot thing is exposed to cold. But 
a habitus is not a standard quality: it can decrease even when its opposite is not present, in such a 
way that a virtue can waste away until what remains is only the natural disposition, without the 
individual ever having done anything vicious that would cause him to lose that virtue. 
5. The unity of habitus 
It is hard to determine how habitus can be considered as united, single things. A habitus can help 
explain why it is with the same proficiency that a given series of seemingly heterogeneous actions is 
repeatedly performed by an agent. Is it possible to posit a single proficiency when many actions of 
many different faculties are accomplished? Learning to play the guitar, for instance, can easily be 
thought of as a process of acquisition of the guitar-playing habitus. But playing the guitar is a very 
complex activity, which involves many acts of different powers: we need our intellect to understand 
what a guitar is, what is the function of each of its parts, what specific song we want to play, what 
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exactly our fingers must do to play it; we also need our fingers to be able to perform the right moves 
quickly and exactly; we need our hearing to be able to recognize if we play well or not; and we need 
our will to command all of these powers to work together towards the same goal. 
 The same problem can be found at another level, inside a given faculty. When our intellect 
performs a mathematical demonstration, we form certain premises and derive a conclusion from it. 
It can be hard to understand how several such demonstrations can be proficiently performed with 
the same habitus. For instance, demonstrating that a triune God is conceivable and that a certain sin 
demands a certain penance does not seem to appeal at all to the same notions and reasoning 
processes. Nonetheless, thirteenth-century theologians usually consider theology to be a single 
habitus of the soul. At the end of the thirteenth century, as the question of the status of theology as a 
science became a major point of discussion, the problem became acute, first as regards theology and 
then science in general. 
On this subject, Pascale Bermon shows the historical evolution of the different options chosen 
by medieval authors regarding the ontological unity of scientific habitus.41 A habitus can be a single 
entity in the mind which corresponds to the knowledge of a single discipline (e.g., one can have the 
habitus of geometry, which facilitates every intellectual operation pertaining to geometry); or there 
can be an entity in the mind of an individual for every syllogism known by this individual, which 
allows him to easily and quickly repeat this syllogism in his mind; finally, there can be an entity in 
the mind for each proposition it knows. 
In the late thirteenth century, Aquinas and Henry of Ghent share the view that a habitus 
corresponds to one discipline, defined by its formal object. For instance, theology has as its formal 
object what is divinely revealed, whatever that may be. Therefore, any act by which something is 
known as divinely revealed is an actualization of the habitus of theology. Duns Scotus refines the 
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model and distinguishes two kinds of habitus: one is the “common” habitus, corresponding to a 
discipline with a formal object, the other is the “proper” habitus, constituting the knowledge of 
single proposition. One could say that for Scotus any act of knowing a given proposition reinforces 
the habitus by which we know, and all acts of knowing single propositions reinforce the knowledge 
we have of the discipline to which this proposition belongs. This corresponds to our experience of 
mathematical knowledge: repeating a single demonstration makes us better able to perform it over 
and over again but it also increases our mathematical proficiency as a whole. Peter Auriol is rather 
skeptical about Scotus’s innovation. He examines and takes seriously a great number of criteria, but 
ends up favouring the view of habitus as corresponding to a discipline. Ockham follows the way 
opened by Scotus and focuses on “proper” habitus. He develops a radical nominalistic stance and 
defends the idea that a given habitus is nothing more than the knowledge of a given conclusion; his 
position is dealt with in detail just below. Finally, Wodeham comes back to a more moderate 
position and holds the view that to a habitus there corresponds a syllogism, while Gregory of 
Rimini is faithful to Ockham and is a staunch proponent of the idea that a habitus is simply the 
knowledge of a proposition. 
A shift clearly occurs with Ockham. His position on scientific habitus is examined in detail by 
Jenny Pelletier and Magali Roques. Pelletier explains42 that his view can be summed up as obeying 
what she calls a “Principle of Object-Act-Habit-Specification.” According to this principle: 
(i) A specific distinction between acts corresponds to a specific distinction between 
habits and vice versa in case such acts and habits are causally related, and (ii) is 
determined by a specific distinction between objects, which (iii) is determined by a 
specific distinction between the subject and predicate terms of these objects. 
This basically means that there are as many habitus as there are objects that can be grasped by a 
given intellect. For instance, knowing the conclusion of a syllogism entails not only having a 
habitus for each of the premises and one for the conclusion, but also one habitus for each of the 
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terms that make up all of these propositions. This implies that a given science (as a discipline or a 
given body of knowledge) is not a single habitus in such a way that it could have numerical unity. 
Ockham claims that it has merely aggregate unity. According to Pelletier, propositions whose 
subject terms, predicate terms, or both belong in a given hierarchy (such as the hierarchy which 
holds between “animal,” which is higher than “bird,” which in turn is higher than “swallow”) are 
part of the same science. 
In her paper, Roques43 comes back to the “Principle of Object-Act-Habit-Specification” and 
examines why Ockham accepts this principle. According to her, Ockham advances only an 
indispensability argument to defend it: if such a distinction did not hold, then we would have no 
other criteria to understand how habitus and acts are distinct from each other. The same 
indispensability argument explains why habitus of a species must be caused by acts of the same 
species: through efficient causation, the form of the act is transferred to the habitus in such a way 
that it is of the same species. As Roques puts it: “Efficient causation warrants sameness.” 
Tarek Dika’s paper shows that the debate about the unity of scientific habitus went on at least 
until Descartes, who provides a highly original solution. In the Regulae, Descartes holds that the 
unity of science is to be found in a certain mode of intentionality, according to which all things 
appear to us as simple natures or as composed of simple natures, such as shape or extension for 
material things. Being composed of simple natures is not a trait of the things themselves in virtue of 
which they could be considered part of the same united set, which would then lend its unity to the 
science that examines them. On the contrary, this is a property all things have only insofar as they 
are related to our intellect as it grasps them. For Descartes, being able to grasp them as such is 
precisely that to which the habitus of science disposes its subject. Basically, then, the habitus of 
science is the same for all of its objects, because it is simply a certain mode of apprehension that 
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can be applied to any object, material as well as spiritual. Its unity, then, comes from its function, 
not its objects, which are really all possible objects of science. Of course, for Descartes, the problem 
is not the same as for the medieval scholastics, given that the objects of science are not necessarily 
propositions or syllogisms. Nonetheless, Dika convincingly shows, contrary to the commonly held 
interpretation, that the scholastic concept of habitus that Descartes inherits is at the heart of his 
account of science, at least in the Regulae. 
What applies to scientific habitus applies just as well to moral habitus. Martin Pickavé, for 
instance, gives us some staggering numbers: for Peter Auriol, there are “eighteen virtues falling 
under prudence, twenty-two forms of justice, fifteen of courage, and twenty-five of moderation.”44 
These four main categories are determined according to their formal objects: all forms of 
moderation for instance, concern “things which attract us excessively.” Such a phrase describes the 
formal object of moderation, though, as can be seen, having a single formal object does not warrant, 
for Auriol, an ontological unity of virtues. This is not surprising given his position (indicated above) 
on scientific habitus. From this example, we can conjecture that authors use the same model to 
account for the unity of all kinds of habitus, though this requires further confirmation. 
As regards the challenge posed by the number of faculties involved in a single act, the study of 
moral habitus is of particular relevance. Indeed, they are often more complex than intellectual ones, 
in that, in the medieval view, they frequently unite several powers of the soul in a single purpose: at 
the very least, to accomplish a morally good act one has to know what good is, and have the desire 
to act upon this knowledge. 
Nicolas Faucher shows45 that the habitus of faith, in the view of Bonaventure, Olivi, and Scotus, 
requires several kinds of act to be fully actualized: at least one in the intellect, which is the act of 
believing objects, and one in the will, which is the act by which the will causes the intellectual act 
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of believing. This is necessary both because the act of faith is supposed to be virtuous and free, and 
thus to involve the will, and because objects of faith are not by themselves evident enough to 
produce an immediate intellectual assent. But this begs the question: is the habitus of faith a habitus 
of the will, of the intellect, or of both? There are, it seems, as many answers as there are authors. 
For Bonaventure, the habitus of faith facilitates every act leading to the ultimate act of believing: 
the intellectual judgement that objects of faith ought to be believed, the act of the will by which the 
intellect is commanded to believe, and the act of believing itself. For Olivi, the first act is that of an 
instinct, while the act of the will and the act of the intellect are of one or several habitus. Scotus 
seems to think that the habitus of faith is merely intellectual and causes the intellect to believe as 
soon as an act of the will produces it in the intellect. It can be said that the habitus of faith, in all the 
various models that are supposed to explain its role and proper features, is sometimes a unifying 
habitus facilitating the acts of several powers of the soul in order to accomplish the final act of faith 
to which it disposes the soul, and sometimes a single entity in a single power of the soul. 
A similar example is given by Pickavé regarding Peter Auriol.46 For Auriol, even if the will of a 
man is inclined to courageous acts, should nothing prevent his passions from impeding his brave 
acts, he cannot be said to be virtuous. Thus, in order to be properly said to have a moral habitus, an 
individual must have, according to Pickavé’s formulation, a collection of inclinations, all aimed at 
inclining to or preventing any move against a given type of act. The unity of such a habitus is called 
a “unity of the whole.” The inclinations that make up such a habitus reinforce each other in the 
same way that a given syllogism in one science improves our knowledge of the other syllogisms 
that are part of it. Should one inclination be lost, the habitus in question could not be said to be the 
same. 
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This ends our systematic overview of the nature and function of habitus. We will conclude this 
introduction by examining two major kinds of habitus, which were at the core of the medieval 
discussion, namely intellectual and moral habitus. 
6. Intellectual habitus 
In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, cognition was conceived according to a thoroughly 
empiricist Aristotelian model according to which a cognitive content is produced on the basis of a 
process of the transmission of a form (or essential structure) from an external object into the 
intellect. More precisely, when something is perceived, a representation of it, called a phantasm, is 
impressed the faculty of imagination. The agent intellect then abstracts from this phantasm the 
concept of the thing, and this concept is imprinted in the patient intellect. This impression 
constitutes the act of intellection: the form of a certain intentional content shapes the intellect. 
Intellectual habitus are central to such a view of cognition. This is why a strong and long-lived 
interest in their specificity was sparked among medieval thinkers. The main question raised is the 
following: is the same entity in the soul responsible for both dispositional thinking and occurrent 
thinking? In other words, are habitus responsible merely for the way in which acts of cognition are 
accomplished, or do they also contain the intentional contents of these acts when they are not 
currently happening? 
For most medieval authors, such as Aquinas and Thomas of Sutton, habitus must function as a 
kind of intellectual storage: for them, an intellectual habitus is a species when it is stored in 
memory, capable of being reactivated at will. If one follows Aristotle, such a reactivation is an 
immanent, non-productive act. 
This model underwent many elaborations. For instance, as Hamid Taieb’s paper shows, Aquinas 
defends the idea that the reactivation of an intelligible species in the intellect so that it is present in 
it is only the first moment of intellection, the second being a focusing of the intellect’s attention on 
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that species.47 In his later works, however, Aquinas also thinks that the reactivation of a species can 
give rise to an act that is not immanent, but productive of what he calls, following Augustine, a 
word (verbum). This word is that by which something is known distinctly: for instance, one can 
have the concept of man, but only through the corresponding word can one know that man is a 
rational animal, in other words, know its definitional properties. A word is present in the intellect 
only when it is grasped in act, and it is not stored in it afterwards. The capacity to produce a word, 
however, is part of the intellectual habitus. Thus, according to Taieb, Aquinas holds that intellectual 
habitus are made up of stored intelligible species and the capacity to produce words from these 
species. According to this account, then, intellectual habitus are mixed in their function: they are 
partly constituted by the stored species that serve as a kind of intellectual memory, but they also 
facilitate operations accomplished on the basis of the species. 
This is, of course, not the only possible account of the role of intellectual habitus. Henry of 
Ghent, as Jean-Luc Solère shows, does not hold that there exist any intelligible species stored in the 
intellect.48 Intelligible species are in the intellect only when it actually intelligizes them. But such an 
intellection occurs only when the agent intellect illuminates a phantasm in the imagination. This 
illuminated phantasm is then grasped as an object by the patient intellect: this is intellection. Such a 
view is quite similar to that expressed later by Durand of Saint-Pourçain and Prosper de Reggio 
Emilia, according to Peter J. Hartman.49 Contrary to these authors, however, Henry does think that 
there are habitus in the intellect, but considers them to be intellectual dispositions towards the acts 
of the intellect that do not store their objects. 
Another feature of intellectual habitus is that they are responsible for the organization of the 
species when they come to be actualized. Suppose for instance that I have the habitus of botany. 
                                               
47 See p. 000 
48 See p. 000 
49 See p. 000 
25 
 
This means that I hold in my intellect all or most of the intelligible species without which I could 
not be said to be a botanist. But these species are not merely piled upon each other in a disorderly 
manner: they are structured according to the relations that obtain among the botanical species. The 
order in which species are organized does not always proceed from the same power, for different 
authors. Thomas of Sutton, for instance, according to Solère, thinks it is the intellect that orders the 
species, since this requires operations of comparison between species that can be performed only by 
the intellect.50 The authors studied by Hartman, however, deny that the intellect could be active in 
any way in its own acts, and so also reject the idea that it could perform any operation on species.51 
Rather, the only order to be found is between phantasms in the imagination, and it depends entirely 
on teaching and chance discovery through trial and error. 
7. Moral habitus 
We come to the last element we will discuss in the introduction: freedom. It can be easy to think the 
possession of habitus infringes on the freedom of the agent. Her actions are characterized by a kind 
of path-dependence. In economic theory, this notion describes the behaviour of an agent whose 
preferences are determined in part, all things being equal, by the choices she has made in the past, 
so that the goods she has chosen before appear more desirable to her than if she had not chosen 
them previously, even though her reasons for the previous choice might not hold anymore.52 It 
seems a medieval author could use the notion of habitus to account for such a phenomenon: an 
acquired tendency to choose something that depends exclusively on our past choices. Such a 
tendency could be seen as diminishing the autonomy of a subject because of actions she has done in 
the past. 
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But medieval authors have a different view. For them, having a habitus is not to be determined 
to do one thing rather than another; rather, it is to have certain means at one’s disposal. This of 
course applies particularly well to intellectual habitus. Indeed, having an intellectual habitus is 
simply to have a tool through which one can more easily grasp something or reach conclusions one 
has attained less easily before. As such, habitus can be seen as accelerators of action, but not to the 
detriment of one’s freedom. Using habitus is under the command of the will: it is only when the 
will has chosen to produce the act that the habitus produces its effect on it, making it easier, swifter, 
etc. Having habitus in the will, which most authors think possible, does not change anything in this 
picture: though an act of the will might be more pleasant and easier, the choice to perform it rather 
than another is by no means necessary. Of course, the fact that some acts are easier and more 
pleasant for some people will clearly have an influence on them when they deliberate about what to 
do, because they will take this fact into account. However, there is no reason to think that this 
deliberation and the choice that follows will be any less free than if there had been no habitus. 
On this subject, Aquinas and Scotus occupy a central place, the former because he provides the 
most extensive effort to make Aristotle’s view compatible with the free will defended by Catholic 
doctrine, and the latter because he introduces an innovative new conception of the freedom of the 
will as a synchronic capacity for opposites. Several papers in the volume are dedicated to their 
views and investigate whether they could be closer to each other than usually thought. 
Olivier Boulnois brings to the fore Aquinas’s innovations with respect to Aristotle’s doctrines.53 
In Nicomachean Ethics 2.1, Aristotle, according to Boulnois, distinguishes the notion of habitus 
(hexis) from the common concept of habit (ethos). Ethos bears a deterministic connotation: a 
creature of habit is one who is incapable of shedding its usual behaviours. By contrast, though a 
habitus, like an ethos, is a product of the repetition of similar acts, it does not necessarily force us to 
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act. It is an intermediary between power and act, a durable disposition by which we are related to 
certain acts, through which we have at our disposal the performance of these acts, and that makes 
them easier and better. Habitus opens up new avenues of action, just as a musician, when he 
practises, becomes better at playing his instrument and can play more difficult pieces at will. Thus, 
for Aristotle, habitus, since they improve our capacity to act, are an essential part of being free, in 
the sense of being capable of performing a broad range of actions. Habitus are also an essential part 
of our capacity to act morally, for they determine the way in which we accomplish our acts: it is 
impossible to act justly when one does not have the virtue of justice. Thus, habitus make us 
accountable for our actions. And even though, for Aristotle, they might be strong enough to force us 
to act in a certain way, it is always up to us to begin acquiring them, and thus to become just or 
unjust. 
Now, this conception of free action is not sufficient for a Catholic thinker attached to the 
theological idea of personal merit, which requires the agent to be able to choose to act viciously 
when he could have acted virtuously. As Boulnois explains, the need to take into account 
Augustine’s theory of free will leads Aquinas to emphasize the freedom of the habituated agent: 
though habitus incline us towards acts, it is always in the power of the will to act in accordance with 
them or against them.54 Furthermore, habitus allow us to act pleasurably and spontaneously when 
performing certain acts that, without habitus, we would have to force ourselves to perform: thus, 
habitus increase our freedom to accomplish such acts.55 
Rolf Darge and Can Laurens Löwe56 give us further insight into Aquinas’s view. They sharply 
distinguish two roles of moral habitus. One has to do with goal orientation: habitus make something 
appear good or bad to us according to a certain moral principle. It is through a moral habitus that we 
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judge some goal has to be reached—such as being faithful here and now—according to a certain 
moral principle—that adultery must never be committed. But habitus do not merely present a 
particular goal as having to be reached in the abstract. As Löwe puts it, it has a conative aspect, 
since it actually inclines us to reach it, meaning that it makes it easier and more pleasurable for us to 
reach it. The cognitive aspect is not under our control: we see some action as good whether we want 
it or not. But the conative aspect is such that, although we are inclined to a certain act, actually 
doing it remains under our control, as we have seen. 
In Aquinas’s view, moral habitus are primarily attributed to the intellect inasmuch as it acquires 
moral knowledge, and the will inasmuch as it acquires the tendency to act upon the moral 
judgement of the intellect. But habitus can also be in the sensitive appetites insofar as they can be 
controlled by the rational powers of intellect and will, that is, those powers by which one might act 
one way or another way. They are entirely determined in their action and thus cannot be inclined, or 
rather are totally inclined by nature in only one direction. As Juhana Toivanen shows, Olivi 
disagrees, since for him the senses, both internal and external, can also be habituated in such a way 
that one’s perceptions become clearer and easier.57 Thus, habitus can also be attributed to irrational 
powers. Nonetheless, Aquinas’s view represents a remarkably ample synthesis that brings together 
two of Aristotle’s opinions on habitus, which might appear to be incompatible with each other: that 
habitus have to do with free choice and that they are nonetheless in irrational powers that are 
incapable of it. 
Löwe departs from this consensus reading and claims that a strong form of “character control” 
should be attributed to Aquinas.58 For Aquinas, Löwe contends, choices are synchronically 
contingent: at any given time, whatever our past history, we can choose among alternatives. This 
position must be attributed to Aquinas, since he accepts that there can be sudden changes in one’s 
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preferences and choices that could hardly be explained otherwise. Thus, on this view Aquinas 
believes that our moral character is determined by the myriad choices we make every day. Through 
each one of them, we progressively reinforce or weaken our habitus. 
This interpretation is not unanimously agreed upon, but it has the merit of closely connecting, in 
a new light, Aquinas and Scotus, who are usually presented as sharply opposed to each other. 
Indeed, as Boulnois and Trego clearly demonstrate, Scotus is firmly attached to the freedom of the 
will as capable of synchronically contingent choices.59 
As this particular view strongly underlines, for medieval authors the will can always go against 
its own habitus. But this does not imply that moral habitus become superfluous in making acts 
virtuous. This is particularly true of infused virtues, which are supernatural habitus put in the soul 
by God. No medieval author thinks that it is possible to act in a truly virtuous manner, deserving of 
salvation, without these habitus. 
Are supernatural habitus necessary for accomplishing a virtuous action? Or are they needed 
merely for making virtuous a given action that can be accomplished without them? Faucher uses the 
example of faith to show that there was a historical evolution in which Scotus occupies a pivotal 
point.60 While it seems that for authors of the early thirteenth century there could not be any firm, 
non-evident belief without supernatural faith, from the end of the thirteenth century onwards many 
authors, following Scotus, contend that such belief can be observed in our daily life regarding 
objects of any kind, be they facts of history or geography, or objects of faith. Thus, as Scotus 
affirms, we should posit an acquired habitus of faith to account for these observable facts and posit 
a supernatural habitus only when it is absolutely necessary according to dogma. It is necessary only 
to explain the meritorious character of the act of faith. Thus, Scotus proposes a mixed model: our 
act of faith is an actualization of both our infused supernatural habitus, accounting for its merit, and 
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our acquired natural habitus, accounting for all other properties it has, which are its observable 
properties. Thus, acquired and infused habitus can be complementary and balanced with each other, 
even as they dispose their subject to the very same act and even though they are posited for different 
reasons. As such, supernatural faith, and supernatural habitus in general, give human beings 
freedom, in that they open to them a whole new avenue of actions which are, for the medieval 
authors, the most worthy of all. 
Whether a similar consideration can be made as regards naturally acquired virtues is 
questionable. Are we able to accomplish virtuous acts if we do not have any virtue, such as 
prudence, justice, or courage? As Pickavé mentions, medieval authors such as Auriol and Scotus 
depart from Aristotle and accept that acts can be virtuous without their agent possessing any 
virtuous habitus.61 Pickavé goes so far as to say this is a major change in moral philosophy: the 
morality of an action is no longer derived from the possession of a virtuous or vicious habitus, but 
from extrinsic or intrinsic features of the act itself. One might think that Scotus and Auriol, for 
instance, develop an early form of deontological ethics that can also be found in William of 
Ockham.62 However, we must keep in mind that all medieval ethics takes seriously the idea of 
natural law63 and that the moral choice is a product of the operation of the practical intellect (called 
synderesis by authors such as Aquinas).64 Therefore, if it were maintained that there is such a thing 
as a medieval virtue ethics, according to which moral virtues are a necessary part of the explanation 
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virtuous acts i.e., acts which are virtuous due to the former. I have shown through a detailed 
analysis how Ockham specifies a basic intrinsically virtuous act, which is an act of willing to fulfill 
moral law qua moral law, and how all other acts may be called virtuous through a denominative 
predication.” 
63 For an examination of the difficult relation between virtue ethics and natural law, see Irvine 
(2012). 
64 See note 14. 
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of what counts as a morally virtuous act, then it would have to differ significantly from 
Aristotle’s.65 
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